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1. Can the Germans go Dutch?
Governments all over the developed world try to rhyme quality and access in 
health care with cost containment. For almost all countries this is a big struggle. 
Technological developments, ageing and more demanding patients lead to more 
or less autonomous cost explosions. The introduction of market forces has an 
interesting potential to combine efficiency and quality. Can governments de-
sign rules such that market forces can play their desired role, while achieving 
solidarity? Some countries such as Switzerland and the Netherlands have tried. 
Can other countries follow the Dutch example?
While the German health care reform has been watered down recently, the que-
stion of whether there are lessons to be learned from abroad is still pertinent. 
More notably the much acclaimed Dutch reform comes to mind. Is it really a 
success, and in what sense? If yes, can it be applied to Germany as well? What 
are the do’s and dont’s if the Germans want to go Dutch?
This article is a reflection of my speech in the colloquium “Reform of the Health 
Care System” 4th June 2010 Potsdam, Germany, organised by The Liberal Insti-
tute, the think tank of the Friedrich-Naumann Foundation.1
2. A primer on health care
The health care market is different from many other markets. The information 
asymmetry between patients and health suppliers is bigger than in any other 
market, most developed societies do not accept (substantial) different treat-
ments for different income groups, and some health costs are prohibitively high 
for individuals to bear. 
For those reasons a completely free market for health care does not exist any-
where in the world. A number of the mentioned problems for free markets can 
be solved by a combination of savings and insurance. 
Yet, health insurance is not like car insurance. While the car insurance system 
relies on a carrot and stick system to encourage prudent behaviour, for health 
1 I thank the participants of the colloquium for fruitful discussions.
6this is less possible. The extent to which one can differentiate premiums on the 
basis of behaviour is open for discussion. But since only a limited (although in-
creasing) number of health problems is behaviour related, a big chunk of health 
problems remains for which risk solidarity applies. 
Besides, it is not always easy to disentangle health issues related to behaviour 
from other factors. Ethical considerations come into play as well. Think, e.g. of 
charging more premium for people with overweight. On what basis is this justi-
fied? Can we prove that the overweight is caused by behaviour? Is it consistent 
with privacy regulation? In a free market, health insurers will charge premiums 
that differ across both observable risk factors and benefit packages designed 
to attract specific risk types. If insurers are free to ask risk adjusted premiums, 
the premium differences can easily go up to a factor 100.2
For some health issues related to old age one can introduce a savings system, 
but again it is open to debate whether this should be mandatory, how to deal 
with those that cannot afford savings, and to what extent differences in health 
outcomes should be dependent on wealth. 
All over the world governments face difficulties of aligning high quality de-
mands, access to health and affordability. More and more evidence exists that 
well designed managed competition in health care has a higher probability of 
spending tax money in a prudent way. As Cutler claims: 
 “The issues on the public agenda are remarkably similar in different countries 
– the rising cost of care, and the perceived inefficiency of the system. [...] The 
result is the beginning of a third wave of health care reform, focusing on 
incentives, and in particular competition, as central elements in the medical 
system […] But recent years have made the regulatory solution increasingly 
less attractive. The march of technology has continued, even in regulated 
systems. Medical-care cost growth resumed when expenditure controls were 
not actively being tightened. Further, cost controls have made the lack of 
efficiency more noticeable. Waiting lines and access restrictions have become 
increasingly important issues as the constraints increase in intensity. As a 
result, the regulatory solution to medical care is coming under disfavor. In 
many countries, there is an incipient movement away from regulation and 
towards market based solutions to medical-care problems.”3
2 http://www.fresh-thinking.org/publications/RiskEquilization.html 
3 D.M. Cutler (2002), Equality, Efficiency and Market Fundamentals: The Dynamics of Inter-
national Medical-Care Reform, Journal of Economic Literature vol.XL, September 2002, 
pp.881-906. 
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While most discussions on health care are about costs, one often forgets that 
health care also produces many benefits, mainly in the form of healthy life years 
gained. Those healthy life years produce not only happiness but also economic 
benefits such as productivity gains. In a recent book Dutch health economist 
Marc Pomp estimated (a crude but if anything conservative estimate) that over 
a life time health care costs € 280.00 but yields no less than € 450.000.4 There 
are worse investments in life. 
While a completely free market for health care is not on, that does not preclude 
a market oriented health system, including patient responsibility, competition, 
profits, entrepreneurship or free prices. 
The Dutch health care system tries to introduce several of these competitive 
aspects into a system based on solidarity. This paper discusses the pro’s and 
con’s of such a system and tries to answer the question whether the system 
might be worthwhile considering for Germany. 
When assessing systems designed by governments that try to mimic markets, 
some expectation management should be put in place. Information asymme-
tries between regulators and health suppliers as well as political realities, make 
that such second or third best worlds are prone to inefficiencies. Typically, in-
formation rents are being created and absorbed by the sector. The question is 
not how to eliminate the information rents. This would be an illusion. The real 
question is how to minimize them such that the mimicked market outperforms 
(equally imperfect) alternatives.
3. History
Before one considers an overhaul of a fundamental system such as a health 
care system there must be something really wrong with the old system. The 
old Dutch system had, like the current German system, a distinction between 
(social) public and private health insurance. 
The downsides of this dual system are that it institutionalizes differences in 
health outcomes on the basis of income, it generates risk selection in the pri-
vate market, it creates problems on the labour market for health professionals, 
4  Marc Pomp (2010). De gouden eieren van de gezondheidszorg, Balans (in Dutch).
8it does not contain adequate incentives for health insurers to actively engage 
in efficiency enhancing operations, it creates waiting lists in the public domain, 
it does not include efficiency incentives for public health suppliers, it is custo-
mer unfriendly (in the public domain), and finally it encourages inefficient real 
estate management.
The only good news about the system was that its health quality was decent to 
good. But clearly the above list is so long that it is no surprise that the system 
was overhauled – although it took 20 years of discussion. Moreover, because 
of well-known health trends, the system was financially not sustainable in the 
long run.
4. The new system
In 2005 the political parties and several interest groups agreed on the new 
Social Health Insurance System and the Healthcare Insurance Act came into 
force. Through this Act a comprehensive national insurance system has been 
established to fund universal healthcare in the Netherlands. The government 
expected the reform to result in a more equitable and cost-efficient health-
care market and aimed at preserving individual freedom of choice with regard 
to healthcare providers.
The new system was adopted in 2006. The most fundamental change in the new 
system is the role of health insurance companies. In order to activate the role of 
insurers as an intermediate between patient and heath suppliers, the government 
has introduced competition between private insurers. All patients can choose 
freely between insurers and can switch once a year, should they wish so. 
The basics
The difference between social insurance and private insurance was elimina-
ted. In order to avoid risk selection, several regulations were imposed by the 
government
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1. Basic package
Insurers compete for clients by offering a basic package of insurance, the con-
tent of which is determined by the government. The reason behind this is that 
the government wants access to basic health service to be universal, i.e. it 
should not depend on your income how fast you are treated or how good you 
are treated.
2. Insurers set prices
Insurers can freely set prices for the basic package. Competition should keep 
premiums in check. Insurers can enter the market everywhere in the country they 
like. The basic insurance premium consists of two components: a community-
rated nominal premium paid by people as from the age of 18. The size of this 
premium varies between insurers and is unrelated to age, gender, income, or 
health status. Secondly, an income-related contribution that equals 7.2 % of the 
income (in 2008) and will be payable up to the income ceiling of € 31,231. A 
healthcare allowance has been introduced in order to keep insurance premiums 
affordable. This allowance is paid via the tax authorities and has been designed 
to make the system financially accessible to all income groups, so that a tax 
credit is given to people before they have to pay the insurance premium.
3. Free choice
Consumers are not constrained in their choice for insurers dependent on where 
they live or what occupation they hold. Traditional differences between insurers 
(e.g. insurance companies for specific occupations) therefore ceased to exist.
4. No price discrimination
Insurers are free to choose prices, but they have to set the same price for the 
basic package for everyone. This avoids risk selection, because insurers cannot 
charge more for unhealthy and therefore costly clients. 
5. Mandatory acceptance
Insurers are forced to take everyone on board. Again this avoids risk selection, 
because unhealthy and therefore costly clients can go wherever they like.
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6. Sophisticated risk equalisation scheme
Given mandatory acceptance and lack of price discrimination insurers that 
have expensive pools of clients would go bankrupt. Therefore on the basis of a 
number of criteria such as the place where the insured live, sex, age etc, insurers 
are compensated on an ex ante basis.5 This also avoid risk selection, since the 
incentives to engage in risk selection are greatly reduced (but not completely 
given the fact that the equalisation is by nature imperfect). 
In fact sometimes it can even yield positive incentives to specialize, e.g. in chro-
nically ill patients, since insurers get compensation. If they are more efficient 
than their competitors the compensation serves as a so-called yardstick. Since 
the yardstick is a compensation based on average efficiency, insurers who beat 
the average can make a profit from the compensation.
7. Additional package
Insurers can also offer additional packages of health insurance. There are no 
constraints on additional packages, e.g. in the sense of price discrimination. 
About 90 % of the people have some form of additional insurance.
8. Profits
Insurance companies are allowed to make profits on the operation of health 
insurance premiums and can pay dividends to the shareholders. This last point 
has been a major issue of debate for what concerns the law’s conformity to 
the European Commission (EC) law. The question is whether the operation by 
private insurance companies is in line with Community law. For this reason the 
Ministry of Public Health, Welfare and Sport (VWS) asked the EC for legal ad-
vice and (in the end) received a positive answer.
The market and profitability
There are about 12 insurers in the Netherlands of which 4 big ones (13 % – 30 % 
market shares). There is quite some regional dominance, but relevant markets 
are national, i.e. every insurer can enter in any part of the country. Market con-
centration, often measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (which is the 
sum of the squares of market shares), is about 0.2. In practice this implies quite 
5 In fact they are also partially compensated ex post, but since that reduces incentives to 
compete, the ex post risk equalisation is going to be stopped.
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a concentrated market (i.e. the equivalent of a market where five players each 
have 20 % market share). 6
Despite the concentration, health insurance in the Netherlands so far cannot 
be seen as a big business. The Dutch Health Authority NZa, estimated the re-
sult on basic packages to be negative in 2008 (- €17), but about €10 per in-
sured in 2009.
The negative result in the first years of the reform were due to the financial 
crisis, to cut-throat competition in the first year to attract customers, and there 
were also losses due to the transition.
Hospitals
There are 93 general hospitals in the Netherlands of which 8 academic hospitals. 
This number is lower (per capita) than most OECD countries, which is explained 
by the fact that Dutch hospitals are relatively big (513 beds on average) and 
the country is densely populated. There are also 52 specialized hospitals (e.g. 
for abortion, dialysis, cancer, asthma).
Revenue of hospitals increased with 6,3 % from €14,3 bln in 2006 to €15,2 
bln. Profit margins are low. 
Like in many OECD countries the Netherlands has introduced DRGs (Diagnosis 
Related Groups), no less than 33.000. Of the prices of those DRG’s 34 % is freely 
negotiable between insurers and hospitals (but the percentage is likely to rise 
in the future); 66 % is regulated by the NZa, the health regulator. The freely 
negotiated price are for common treatments. 
Medical specialists are either on the payroll of hospitals or are organized in 
separate partnerships. Specialists in the Netherlands earn the highest wages in 
the OECD (see Figure 1 and 2).
6 http://www.nza.nl/regelgeving/wetgeving/zorgverzekeringswet/monitor-zorgverzekerings-
markt/
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Figure 1:  Remuneration of specialists in USD PPP, 2004 (or closest available)
Note: *indicates that the average remuneration refers only to physicians practising full-time 
and ** refers to the average remuneration for all physicians including those working 
part-time. In Austria, Switzerland and the United States, the data refer to all physi-
cians (both salaried and self-employed), but since most specialists are not salaried in 
these two countries, the data are presented as referring to self-employed physicians. 
For the United Kingdom, data refer to England.
Source: OECD Health Data 2007 and for the US, Community Tracking Study Physician Survey, 
2004-5.
The reason behind these high earnings are imperfections of the DRG system 
(so that some specialist like radiologists could declare more than is considered 
reasonable), a low number of specialists (see figure 3) and strong bargaining 
position of specialists vis-a-vis government and board of management.
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Figure 2:  Remuneration of specialists ration to average wage, 2004 (or closest 
available)
Note: *indicates that the average remuneration refers only to physicians practising full-time 
and ** refers to the average remuneration for all physicians including those working 
part-time. 
Source: OECD Health Data 2007 and for the US, Community Tracking Study Physician Survey, 
2004-5.
Figure 3:  Number of GPs (general physicians) and specialists per 1000 population, 
2004 (or closest available)
Note:  Some coun-
tries are unable to 
report all their prac-
tising doctors in these 
two categories of GPs 
and specialists. The 
density data relate to 
the year for which the 
remuneration data 
are available in the 
country.
Source: OECD Health 
Data 2007.
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Hospitals have obtained increased financial responsibilities, including real es-
tate management. General hospitals still provide almost all medical services, 
but there is a general tendency towards specialisation (complicated treatments), 
leaving the run of the mill treatments more and more to private clinics.
Hospitals are allowed to make profits but in a constrained way (no dividends), 
making it difficult to attract private capital.
Patients
As said, patients can freely choose between insurers but have mandatory insu-
rance. They are also free to choose between suppliers, although this freedom 
is sometimes spurious (with GPs facing waiting lists in a number of regions). 
Patients can only go to specialists after approval by a general practitioner (ex-
cept from emergencies). 
Patients pay about € 100 per month premium for the basic package, with an 
own risk of € 165 per year (one of lowest in the OECD). Increasing own pay-
ments or own risk has been a politically hot potato for years.
Since managed competition can only work when there is something to choose, 
there have been several initiatives to increase transparency since the introduc-
tion of the new system. The most notable initiative is www.kiesbeter.nl. On this 
website hospitals are compared in a number of dimensions comparing hospitals, 
insurers and diseases. This includes information on waiting lists specified per 
supplier and per disease.
Although hard evidence is not available, the current feeling is that patients are 
still insufficiently responsible for their own health. This creates moral hazard 
issues, and ultimately avoidable health spending.
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5. Outcomes
The next question is how the Dutch system scores on the public goals access, 
quality and affordability. 
Access
Because of the elimination of the difference between private and public health 
insurance, the access has improved both for the previously puplicly insured, as 
well as for the unhealthy privatly insured. Moreover, increased transparency 
has also improved access. The only minus point on access is related to a mer-
ger wave, which has led to a small drop in hospitals. There was a certain fear 
that because nominal premiums have to be paid by everyone (except children), 
this would increase the number of uninsured. Although a small increase was 
observed this was not significant.
Quality
Quality measures come from OECD sources. Let us first look at the well-known 
life expectancy at birth.
One can safely say that there has been a general positive trend throughout the 
OECD countries here, and it is difficult to claim that the new system effected 
something drastic in this domain. The same (but then in the negative) applies 
to another measure of health: the rise of obesity. Such outcomes are more likely 
to be related to diets and prevention than to the system.
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Figure 4: Life expectancy at birth
Life expectancy at birth has increased by more than 10 years in OECD countries since 1960, 
reflecting a sharp decrease in mortality rates at all ages.
Source: OECD Health Data 2009, OECD (http://www.oecd.org/health/healthdata).
Figure 5:  Prevalence estimates of diabetes, adults aged 20-79 years, 2010
Note: The data are age-standardised to the World Standard Population.
Source:  International Diabetes Federation (IDF) (2009), “Diabetes Atlas, 4th edition”.
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Figure 6:  Obesity among adults 
1.  Australia, Czech Republic (2005), Japan, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Slovak Republic (2007), 
United Kingdom and United States figures are based on health examination surveys, rather 
than health interview surveys.
Source:  OECD Health Data 2009, OECD (http://www.oecd.org/health/healthdata).
Figure 7:  Asthma admission rates, population aged 15 and over, 2007
1.  Does not fully exclude day cases.
2. Includes transfers from other hospital units, which marginally elevates rates.
Source:  OECD Health Care Quality Indicators Data 2009 (OECD).
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Figure 8:  Diabetes acute complications admission rates, population aged 15 and 
over, 2007
1.  Does not fully exclude day cases.
2.  Includes transfers from other hospital units, which marginally elevates rates.
Source: OECD Health Care Quality Indicators Data 2009 (OECD).
A health outcome that is more likely to depend on systems is the length of 
stay in acute care. But according to CBS (The Dutch Statistical Office) 2008 
the average length of stay is halved in 25 years from 14 to 7 days. So there is 
a general trend towards more frequent but shorter stays. The current system is 
unlikely to be a major factor here.
It follows that general health outcomes are not necessarily very telling for the 
performance of the new system. Most health outcomes follow general trends 
in society, and in so far that trends can be curbed this falls by and large outside 
the scope of the health insurance system (e.g. prevention).
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Figure 9:  Average length of stay for normal delivery
The average length of stay for normal delivery has become shorter in all OECD countries, even 
if large variations still exist.
Source: OECD Health Data 2009, OECD (http://www.oecd.org/health/healthdata).
One way that moves beyond this difficulty is to see how the Dutch system scores 
on a composite index create by the Consumer Health Powerhouse. This index 
shows that the Netherlands is on top of the list for the EU for the last two ye-
ars, prompting them to say that: 
 The Netherlands is characterized by a multitude of health insurance providers 
acting in competition, and being separate from caregivers/hospitals. Also, 
the Netherlands probably has the best and most structured arrangement for 
patient organisation participation in healthcare decision and policymaking 
in Europe. Here comes the speculation: one important net effect of the Ne-
therlands healthcare system structure would be that healthcare operative 
decisions are taken, to an unusually high degree, by medical professionals 
with patient co-participation. Financing agencies and healthcare amateurs 
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such as politicians and bureaucrats seem farther removed from operative 
healthcare decisions in the Netherlands than in almost any other European 
country. This could in itself be a major reason behind the Netherlands landslide 
victory in the EHCI 2009.7
And in their news item they even claim: Obama – take a look at the Netherlands 
if you want to reform the US healthcare system in a good way!8
Maybe the latter quote is exaggerated but it shows that the system at least 
gets a number of things right.
Figure 10:  Cancer five-year relative survival rates
Note:  Survival rates are age standardised to the International Cancer Survival Standards 
Population. 95 % confidence intervals are represented by H in the relevant figures.
Source:  OECD Health Care Quality Indicators Data 2009 (OECD).
7 The Euro Health Consumer Index: http://www.healthpowerhouse.com/files/Report%20
EHCI%202009%20091005%20final%20with%20cover.pdf
8 http://www.healthpowerhouse.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2
35:obama-take-a-look-at-the-netherlands-if-you-want-to-reform-the-us-healthcare-
system-in-a-good-way-
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Affordability
Let us see how much countries are spending on health.
Figure 11:  Health expenditure per capita 2007
Health expenditure per capita varies widely across OECD countries. The United Sates spends 
almost two-and-a-half times the OECD average.
1.  Health expenditure is for the insured population rather than resident population.
2.  Current health expenditure.
Source: OECD Health Data 2009, OECD (http://www.oecd.org/health/healthdata).
It would be helpful to know how the cost development would have been without 
the new system. Unfortunately, such a comparison is impossible to make. 
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Figure 12:  Annual average real growth in per capita health expenditure, 1997-2007
Across OECD countries, health expenditure has grown by slightly more than 4% annually over 
the past ten years.
Source:  OECD Health Data 2009, OECD (http://www.oecd.org/health/healthdata).
The new system has directly influenced costs in three ways. One indication 
that the system created incentives is that the prices for the freely negotiable 
segment were on average lower than the prices in the regulated segment. A 
second cost container lies in the (difficult to measure) cultural aspects: both 
insurers and health suppliers work in a much more business oriented way. But 
that also created the last cost link: new business opportunities were sought, 
which in part is good news, but in part also led to substantial cost increases, 
since some business opportunities were merely cash cows based on unnecessary 
but lucrative treatments and diagnosis. 
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Figure 13:  Life expectancy in years (2007 or latest year available)
Higher health spending per capita is generally associated with higher life expectancy, although 
this link tends to be less pronounced in countries with higher spending. Other factors also in-
fluence life expectancy.
Source: OECD Health Data 2009, OECD (http://www.oecd.org/health/healthdata).
6. Causality
Most of the outcomes (positive or negative) of the previous section were either 
due to general trends in OECD countries or the causality between the new sy-
stem and the outcomes could not be established. For an evaluation of the new 
system we have to rely on other methods. 
Fortunately, the system has been evaluated by the University of Rotterdam to-
gether with research institute Nivel9. The hospital market has been evaluated 
by Sirm, a consultant company. 
9 www.zonmw.nl/index.php?id=7492&tx_vipublicaties_pi1 %5Baction%5D=details&tx_vi-
publicaties_ pi1%5Bid%5D=62
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The University of Rotterdam and Nivel mention as positive aspects: 
a. Increased solidarity as a result of the elimination between public and private 
insurance
b. Increased switching possibilities of clients 
c. More competitive insurance market
d. Increased transparency
e. Increased activity by insurers to negotiate with health suppliers
f. Quality of health care receives more attention than before
The researchers conclude that the overall evaluation result is positive but they 
also notice problems (which I discuss in the next section). To the benefits can 
be added the reduction in waiting lists (although admittedly this is based on 
anecdotal evidence since a structured and consistent measurement does not 
exist over time).
Sirm10 concludes that the Dutch are in comparison low users of hospital ser-
vices, both in terms of visits and length of stay (e.g. 6.3 days versus 8 days in 
Germany). Also perceived access was measured, showing that is only 0.4 % of 
the Dutch complain of limited access (waiting lists) versus 3 % in Germany fi-
nancial barriers).
7. Problems
Whilst the previous section showed positive outcomes for the new system, this 
does by no means imply that the Dutch system is without problems. This sec-
tion discusses some of the problems. The problems do not imply that the system 
does not work. All systems that try to mimic markets do suffer from attempts 
to ‘play the system’, i.e. to attract rents based on imperfection in the system. 
Moreover, as said before, all countries face difficulties to rhyme affordability, 
quality and access in health care.
Insurance
The insurance market does not function properly if there are too few insurers 
on the market. Yet, it seems that the Dutch Competition authority have faced 
10 http://www.sirm.nl/sirm_3_publicaties_nvz_brancherapport_2010.php
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some difficulties dealing with health mergers (see also text below on hospitals). 
Since mergers do reduce the number of players on the market such difficulties 
are potentially worrying. 
The difficulties with health mergers is that judges have insufficient feel for the 
fact that liberalized markets are different form other markets, in the sense that 
the goal is not to preserve competition but to stimulate competition. This re-
quires a more restrictive stance towards mergers. Moreover, the judges put the 
bar on evidence requirements quite high, while it is hard to collect the evidence 
in markets with ‘no history’ and without free prices.11
Another problem arises with attempts by insurers to distinguish themselves for 
their competitors. One way to accomplish this is by offering so-called preferred 
provider arrangements. These arrangements offer (sometimes substantial) red-
uctions to clients on their premium if they are prepared to reduce their choices 
for supply (standard GP and standard hospital services) to a limited set of sup-
pliers. The insurer can then negotiate favourable deals with those suppliers such 
that the knife can cut both ways. 
More general the Erasmus University of Rotterdam and Nivel observe a relatively 
limited activity by insurers on prevention and negotiations with suppliers.
Hospitals
Despite the improvements mentioned in the previous sections, there are still a 
number of pending issues to be resolved.
1. Specialists, governance
The Board of Management of hospitals has difficulties to get the incentives of 
medical specialists in line with the interests of the hospital. It would perhaps 
be easier to have a direct contractual relation between the hospitals and the 
specialists to resolve this. 
2. Mergers
The difficulties with health mergers mentioned in the previous section hold 
even stronger for the hospital market. Scale economies are hardly achievable 
11 M. Canoy and W. Sauter (2010), “Out of control? Hospital mergers in the Netherlands and 
the public interest “, European Competition and Law Review issue 9.
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at the current size of hospitals, but competition is reduced after the merger, 
while competition is already fairly weak. Again, this requires a more restrictive 
stance towards mergers.12
3. Transparency, media
The advantage of increased transparency and media attention is that problems 
are more visible today than they were yesterday. However, the downside of this 
increased transparency is first of all that it focuses too much on incidents (and 
thus more generic problems are ignored). Secondly, the negative tone generally 
seen in the media (no headlines are made when a hospital performs well) cre-
ates negative spill-overs to the sector. In the light of increased needs for labour 
in the future these negative spill-overs create problems.
4. DRGs
The introduction of DRGs by itself was an improvement over the old system, 
since it allowed more insight into the costs and made management of hospitals 
easier. However, the Dutch government (notably stimulated by the sector!) intro-
duced more than 30.000 DRGs and made issues too complex, thereby reducing 
the benefits of the system since it allowed more opportunities for gaming the 
systems. Currently the government is simplifying the system.
5. Profits, private capital
The Dutch hospitals are allowed to make profits but not to pay dividend. This 
reduces the attractiveness for private capital. In the light of the financial crisis 
and given positive experiences in Sweden and Germany with private hospitals, 
there is a lot to say to open up this market.
6. Culture, accountability
A final important deficiency of the hospital market (and this is equally true for 
a number of other semi-public services such as in social housing or in edu-
cation13) is that there is still lack of openness, accountability and peer review. 
12 M. Canoy and W. Sauter (2010), “Out of control? Hospital mergers in the Netherlands and 
the public interest “, European Competition and Law Review issue 9.
13 Governance in semi-publieke instellingen: Welke lessen kunnen we leren uit het buiten-
land? Ecorys 2010 (in dutch). http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/
rapporten/2010/06/07/governance-in-semi-publieke-instellingen-welke-lessen-kunnen-
we-leren-uit-het-buitenland-eindrapport-ecorys.html
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It is known that in organisations with professionals, freedom and reward for 
performance complemented with accountability is the best way to guarantee 
good results.14
Patients
In the triangle insurers-hospitals-patients, patients also need to be mobilised. 
The problems are:
1. Limited sense of own responsibility
Patients still think too much that health care is for free (the so-called ‘Null-
Preis Mentalität’). Raising awareness of patients that such is not the case is 
still a priority. 
2. Out of pocket payments
One way of promoting awareness is by increasing the own risk and payments. 
Currently the out-of pocket payments in the Netherland are quite low (see 
charts below)
Figure 14:  Out-of-pocket expenditure as a share of final household consumption, 
2007 (or nearest available year)
Source: OECD Health Data 2009
14 Governance in semi-publieke instellingen: Welke lessen kunnen we leren uit het buiten-
land? Ecorys 2010 (in dutch). http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/
rapporten/2010/06/07/governance-in-semi-publieke-instellingen-welke-lessen-kunnen-
we-leren-uit-het-buitenland-eindrapport-ecorys.html
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6.3.1 Out-of-pocket expenditure as a share of final household consumption, 2007 (or nearest available year)
Source: OECD Health Data 2009.
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6.3.2 Out-of-pocket medical costs in the past year, 
seven OECD countries, 2007
Source: 2007 Commonwealth Fund International Health Policy
Survey.
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Figure 15:  Out-of-pocket medical costs in the past year, seven OECD countries, 
2007
Source: OECD Health Data 2009
In the light of this and of affordability it is quite likely that the Dutch will in-
crease out-of pocket payments in due time.15
3. Most prominent: prevention
The role of patients in prevention is also too weak. The problem here is that 
those persons who will be most affected and are most vulnerable are also the 
most difficult to reach. Attempts to resolve this are still in the infancy stages.
15 See http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/rapporten/2010/06/16/
evaluatie-naar-verplicht-eigen-risico.html for Ecorys research on this (in Dutch).
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8. Assessment and future
The overall assessment of the new system is that whilst there are numerous 
problems, on balance the system yields more benefits than costs. The most 
important improvement is that the system has prompted a change in culture 
of insurance companies and hospitals. Moreover by eliminating the difference 
between private and public heath care, it has enhanced solidarity. The compe-
tition in the insurer market is still vulnerable but it did create a breakthrough 
in the market for drugs.
In the old budget spending culture there was little feel for efficiency enhan-
cement. Cost containing was imposed from above. Typically imposed cost con-
tainment implies waiting lists and spoiling (e.g. of scarce space). Increased 
transparency has added to this cultural shift. While in the old system problems 
were often hidden, this is much less the case now.
But having said that, the Dutch are facing challenging and uncertain times. 
Will the new government continue with the new system? In all likelihood they 
will since the liberal party has won the elections. Will the new government be 
sufficiently ambitious to improve quality, cut on red tape and strengthen the 
new system in the numerous areas where improvements can be made? We will 
have to wait and see. First of all, we do not have a new government as of yet.
All developed countries face difficulties containing costs without jeopardizing 
quality or access. Complexity is always there irrespective of the system. Regu-
lated insurer competition seems a good mix between freedom and solidarity. 
In particular if it is given the time to develop and if a number of problems will 
be tackled by the new government.
9. What about Germany?
The question raised at the colloquium was whether the Germans could go 
Dutch. In general when talking about comparisons of systems of social security 
or health one should be cautious not to impose institutions from one country 
to another. Cultural and historical differences often create path dependency. 
Differences in collective preferences lead to different choices. Different political 
constellations play their role too.
30
But irrespective of these caveats, there are a number of reasons why the Ger-
mans could indeed go Dutch, should they wish so. The German system looks 
similar to the old Dutch system. The main problems – as I inferred from the 
colloquium – are the duality in the system, the lack of transparency, the too 
broad coverage of the package, big spending on drugs, the lack of incentives 
by insurers, and the lack of cost containment.
Adopting the Dutch system will get rid of a few of these problems or at least will 
reduce some. The duality issues will be resolved and similar to the Netherlands 
the new system is also likely to create a more entrepreneurial spirit in the insu-
rers market. In the hospital market the Germans are ahead of the Netherlands 
in the sense that they already have private hospitals who seem to do quite well 
and who will henceforth keep a check on the other hospitals.
Cost containment will also be an issue in new system, but if there is a check on 
unnecessary health treatments and diagnostic tests, it will not be worse than 
in the old system.
The system only works if the insurers market is (to a sufficient degree) competi-
tive. This requires first of all a sufficient number of insurers (and hence a tough 
stance towards mergers), and secondly insurers should have sufficient tools to 
compete (i.e. be able to effectively negotiate with supply). Moreover, to avoid 
risk selection and to compensate for unhealthy pools of insured clients, an ad-
vanced system of ex ante risk equalisation should be adopted. 
As a final lesson from the Netherlands, should the Germans adopt de Dutch sy-
stem they might need to avoid a tendency to over-regulate the market.
10. Conclusion
The new Dutch health care system seems to work pretty well, when one con-
siders international comparisons, but also when one compares the new system 
with the old one. 
The most important benefit is that the new system has prompted a change in 
culture of insurance companies and hospitals. Moreover by eliminating the dif-
ference between private and public heath care, it has enhanced solidarity. Cost 
containment is still a big issue. 
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Since Germany has a system with many similarities to the old Dutch system, 
the Germans might want to go Dutch, should they wish so. 
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